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COMMENTS
THE NEED FOR LIBERALIZED RULES OF
DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Liberal discovery techniques have become an accepted part of
civil procedure. Pretrial conferences, interrogatories and stipula-
tions are commonly used in resolving civil disputes." However, at-
tempts to expand the use of discovery techniques in criminal pro-
cedure have been sharply criticized.
The primary purpose of this comment is to examine present dis-
covery techniques available in both federal and Wisconsin practice.
Following a brief explanation of the arguments for and against
liberalized criminal discovery, there will be a discussion of the per-
tinent Feleral Rules of Criminal Procedure and the federal cases.
Next, the relevant Wisconsin Statutes and holdings of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court will be discussed. Finally, possible trends in
Wisconsin criminal discovery will be considered.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST LIBERAL DISCOVERY
Some states permit very little criminal discovery by defendants
and a number of arguments have been advanced in support of this
view.2
One of the main contentions is that if all the evidence to be of-
fered against the defendant is made available to his prior to trial,
there will be an increase in the incidents of perjury and illegal sup-
pression of evidence. Also, witnesses, fearing reprisals, would be
less willing to supply information to law enforcement officials if
they knew that the defendant would learn their identity and prob-
able testimony before the trial.
Another argument is that in view of the procedural safeguards
already given to the defendant, such as the presumption of inno-
cence and the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the liberal-
ization of discovery procedure would give the defendant an undue
advantage. This would be especially true in view of the increasing
crime rate.
However, the arguments against liberal criminal discovery have
1 It has been suggested that the adoption of pretrial methods in criminal pro-
cedure would allow speedier trials, avoid repetition and produce less con-
fusion at trial. Kaufman, Pre-trial In Criminal Cases, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'"
150 (1959), Kaufman, The Apalachin Trial: Further Observations On Pre-
trial In Criminal Cases, 44 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 53 (1960).
2 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A. 2d 881 (1950). Views opposed to the liberal-
ization of criminal discovery are expressed in many law review articles,
eg., Grady, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1959 U. ILL. L. F. 827 (1959);
Steffes, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 10 PRAc. LAW. 61 (1964) ; Panel on Pre-
trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 320, 322 (1965)
Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 74 (1963).
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been met by equally strong arguments in favor of more liberal dis-
covery techniques.3
In support of their view, the proponents point to the fact that
the liberalization of discovery in civil procedure has not been ac-
companied by a corresponding increase of perjury and suppression
of evidence cases. Also, the existing penalties for perjury, bribery,
and threatening of witnesses will continue to provide an adequate
safeguard. Rather than increase the incidents of perjury and the
other abuses, they believe that liberal criminal discovery procedure
is likely to decrease the incidents of conflicting testimony, since both
parties would be aware of the evidence facing them and therefor
would be less likely to risk the imposition of the penalties for per-
jury and the suppression of evidence.
The need for access to the scientific facilities of law enforcement
agencies is the basis of another argument for liberal discovery.
While the prosecution obtains scientific data, fingerprints, criminal
records of witnesses, and copies of statements taken by the police
as a matter of course, these important sources of information are
frequently barred to defense counsel. Many feel that this advantage
outweighs any procedural advantage which the defendant might
have, especially where indigent defendants are involved.4  There-
fore, in order to insure a fair trial, access to information in the hands
of the prosecution is a necessity.
Finally, the proponents argue that in the area of criminal dis-
covery, the presumption of innocence attaches, de facto, at the trial
level of criminal proceedings. Assuming that the defendant is in-
nocent, they argue it is unlikely that he will know the details of the
crime and as a result, will be unable to properly prepare his case.
The prosecution on the other hand, will be better able to obtain this
information due to the efforts of the law enforcement agencies.
3Articles favoring liberalized discovery include Aronson, Pre-trial Discovery
In Criminal Proceedings, 27 BROOKLYN L. Rrv. 318 (1961); Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth? 1963 WASH. U.
L. Q. 279 (1963) ; Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv.
163 (1963) ; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard,
1964 Duica L. J. 477; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Crininal Cases,
12 STAN. L. PEv. 293 (1960) ; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149 (1960); Kaufman,
Pre-trial In Criminal Cases, 42 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 150 (1959); Kaufman,The
Apalachin Trial: Further Observations On Pre-trial In Criminal Cases, 44
J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 53 (1960) ; Krantz, Pretrial Discovery it Criminal Cases:
A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REv. 127 (1962);
Louisell, Criminal Discovery Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 CAxIF. L. REv.
56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found In Criminal Discovery, 39
N. Y. U. L. REv. 228 (1964); Comment, Developments in Discovery, 74
HARV. L. REv. 940; Symposium: Discovery In Federal Criminal Cases, 33
F.R.D. 47, 56, 82 (1963); Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty
to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L. J .136 (1964).
4 Everett, Discovery iu Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE
L. J. 477, 480 (1964).
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While those favoring liberal discovery generally concede that
the possibility of bribery and other methods of suppressing evidence
are matters of general concern, they feel that barring discovery is
not the best solution. Rather, procedural safeguards should be estab-
lished to prevent abuses. For example, it has been suggested that
the concept of the "protective order" should be borrowed from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would allow the trial court,
upon a proper showing, to deny information to the defendant until
trial.5 Both English criminal procedure and American court-martial
procedure are examples of successful attempts to liberalize criminal
procedure.
6
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DISCOVERY
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In order to determine what rights of discovery the accused has
in criminal procedure, it will be necessary to first consider the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure and the decisions of the federal
courts. While a number of provisions for discovery can be found in
the Federal Rules, these have been strictly construed. As a result,
the value of these rules has been limited.
Rule 5(c) gives the defendant the opportunity to hear and to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at a preliminary examination.
However, the Government may call at trial, witnesses who were
not present at the preliminary examination. Since only probable
cause must be shown at the preliminary examination, rather than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution is not likely to
produce all of its evidence. Moreover, there is no requirement of a
preliminary examination if a grand jury returned the indictment,
and in practice a preliminary examination is rarely granted.7
Grand jury testimony may be made available to the defense prior
to trial by court order under Rule 6(e). In order to obtain copies of
the testimony, the defendant must show " 'a particularized need'
exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy." 8 De-
fense motions to obtain witnesses' testimony or even the defend-
ant's own testimony are usually denied, except in prosecution for
perjury arising out of the testimony before a grand jury.9
Under Rule 7(f) the defendant may obtain additional informa-
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage In Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1195 (1960).
G Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth?
1963 WASH. U. L. Q. 279, 293 (1963) ; Datz, Discovery In Criminal Procedure,
16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163, 170-171, (1963) ; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases
In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L. J. 477, 493-495 (1964).
7Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE
L. J. 477,481 (1964).
s Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959). How-
ever, a showing of contradiction between the grand jury testimony and testi-
mony at trial is not necessary.
9Symposium: Discovery In Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 109 (1963).
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tion to clarify the indictment by moving for a bill of particulars. At-
tempts to use this method as a means to discover government wit-
nesses, documents or testimony have not been successful.' 0
The district judge is authorized by Rule 16 to order an inspection
of tangibles obtained by seizure or process, if the items sought are
material to the preparation of the defense and the request is reason-
able. This rule has been strictly construed to deny discovery of wit-
nesses' names and addresses, defendant's statements, and scientific
reports."1
Pretrial subpoena is the subject of Rule 17(c), which allows the
judge, on motion, to direct that books, papers, documents, or objects
designated in a subpoena duces tecum be produced and the defense be
allowed to inspect them prior to trial. The materials must be sought
"in a good faith effort to obtain evidence" and not as part of a "fish-
ing expedition."' 2 They must be: evidentiary and relevant, not other-
wise procurable by the defendant in advance of trial, and necessary
to proper preparation for trial.13
The Jencks Act, which will be considered in the next section of this
article, is an additional factor to be considered in applying the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.14
THE DFECISIONS IN FEDERAL CASES
While under the Federal Rules motions may be made to discover
documents before trial, attempts to do so are rarely successful, espe-
cially in situations involving the statements of government witnesses."5
In the case of Jencks v. United States,'0 the Supreme Court held that
defense counsel must be given access at trial to prior statements of
government witnesses concerning the subject matter of their testimony.
But the ensuing controversy caused the passage of the Jencks Act to
insure that the rationale of that decision would not be extended to the
time prior to trial.
1 7
10 Supra note 4, at 482; supra note 9, at 105 and 106.
11 Datz, Discovery In Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 163, 172 (1963);
supra note 9, at 106 and 107; supra note 4, at 482.
12 Datz, Discovery It Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 163, 172-174;
supra note 9, at 107-109; supra note 4 at 482-485.
"13Supra note 9, at 108.
14 18 U.S. C. §3500 (1957).
15 Supra note 5, at 1181.
16 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Supra note 5, at 1182.
17 Kratz, Pretrial Discovery In Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair and I,-
partial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REV. 127, 142 (1962). Traynor, Ground Lost and
Found In Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y. U. L. REv. 228, 241 (1964). Prior to
the Jencks decision it had already been recognized that the defendant had a
right to inspect government papers for impeachment purposes if the evidence
is relevant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule. Gordon v. United
States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953). Apparently the trial judge has the affirmative
duty of requiring the production of all relevant evidence. Campbell v. United
States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961). This rule was affirmed in Campbell v. United
States, 373 U.S. 487 (1962) which held that a reasonable accurate copy of the
statement of witness may be made available for impeachment purposes.
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The generally accepted view seems to be that there is no constitu-
tional right to pretrial discovery and that the granting of discovery at
trial along with a continuance is sufficient to meet the requirements of
the Constitution. ' However, the Supreme Court has said that the grant-
ing of discovery and inspection is the better practice, although no vio-
lation of the fourteenth amendment is involved.' 9
A number of cases have arisen in the area of suppression of evi-
dence and the use of perjured testimony by the prosecution. These cases
seem to temper the generally accepted Constitutional rules. The duty of
the prosecutor was first defined as one "not to suborn perjury, not to
use evidence known to be false, and to correct state witnesses who lie."' 20
This duty was broadened by United States ex rel Almeida v. Baldi2'
and United States ex rel Thompson v. Dye.2 These cases hold that the
prosecutor's motive for suppressing evidence is no longer controlling,
but rather what effect the suppression has on the defendant's case.
23
The Supreme Court accepted this rationale in the case of Brady v. M'ary-
land:2 4
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan [that the states have a
duty to prevent convictions obtained without due process of law]
is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. (Emphasis added.) 25
The Court also clarified the duty of the prosecution:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an ac-
cused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or
reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant. That casts the prosecution in the role of an architect
of a proceeding that does not comport with the standards of jus-
tice, even though, as in the present case his action is not 'the re-
sult of guile', to use the words of the Court of Appeals.&
is Traynor, Ground Lost and Found In Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y. U. L. REV.
228, N. 77 at p. 242 (1964).
19 Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293,
302 (1960) ; Steffes, Discovery in Crimnlal Cases, 10 PRAc. LAW. 61, (1962).
20 Comment, 74 YALE L. J. 136 at 138 (1964).
2' 195 F. 2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952).
22221 F. 2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955).
23 Supra note 20, at 140.
24373 U.S. 83 (1963).
25 Id. at p. 87. It should be noted that if the statement is in any way relevant to
the case, in the sense that the testimony could have affected the jury's verdict
this is sufficient. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1958). However, a sharp
conflict in the testimony has been held by a state court not to be sufficient,
rather, actual proveable perjury is needed. Bailey v. Warden of Maryland
Penitentiary, 231 Md. 626, 190 A. 2d 547 (1963).
26 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
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The obvious intent of the Supreme Court is to focus upon the harm
caused to the defendant at trial.2 7 Immediately the question arises as to
the possible implications which this decision might have with respect to
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial in the area of pretrial
discovery.
The factor which differentiates the suppression cases and
gives them constitutional dimension is that they grow out of a
situation which makes a fair trial for many defendants nearly
impossible. Suppressed evidence would not be a major problem
if the defendant had facilities adequate to gather his own evi-
dence before the trial. But the defendant's facilities are usually
meager especially when compared to those of the state.... When
the prosecutor aggravates the defendant's lack of ability to obtain
evidence by not revealing to him material evidence, the Constitu-
tion has been violated.. . The importance of Brady and the
other suppression cases is not in any new principle they express
but in their indication that the principle has constitutional dimen-
sions and must be enforced in state proceedings3
S
Federal cases following the Brady case have continued the trend and
have recognized that the inability of the defendant to properly prepare
for trial, coupled with the failure of the prosecution to reveal material
evidence will result in the denial of a fair trial to the defendant. In
Ashley v. Texas,29 the failure of the district attorney to disclose the
existence of opinions of the state psychiatrist and psychologist that the
defendants were legally incompetent was viewed as being a fundamental
unfairness, constituting a denial of due process. The defendants' coun-
sel knew nothing of the examination until after the trial. Another case
involved the refusal of a state court to allow the examination of a state-
ment given to the police by the defendant in which the defendant related
a material admission by a witness.30 This was also held to be a denial of
due process. A third case, United States ex rel Meers v. Wilkins,3 1 held
that the prosecution had a duty to make known to the defendant the
existence of two disinterested witnesses who would have testified that
the defendant was not a participant in the robbery. In this case, just as
in the Ashley case, defense counsel was not aware of this material evi-
dence until after the trial.32
2 7 In the case of State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A. 2d 101 (1965) the Maryland
court stated that the test derived from the Brady case is whether the evidence
might be reasonably considered admissible and useful to the defense.
28Supra note 20, at 143-145.
29319 F. 2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
30 United States ex rel Butler v. Maroney, 319 F. 2d 622 (3rd Cir. 1963).
3" 326 F. 2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1964).
32 These cases would tend to support the position of one author that pretrial
discovery should not be at the discretion of the prosecutor, since he being an
advocate, is ideally situated to determine what information should, in the
interests of justice, be made available to defense counsel. Supra note 18, at
237.
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In the light of these holdings the following comment seems appro-
priate:
If the courts accept the effect of the undisclosed evidence
on the defendants preparation for trial as determining whether
due process has been denied, and they cannot reject this standard
without also rejecting the constitutional basis for the suppression
cases, then the complete suppression of evidence can no longer be
the court's only concern. Any failure to reveal evidence before
the trial may affect preparation adversely, even if the evidence is
presented at trial.33
In summation of this development in criminal law it has been suggested
that
Unless the courts repudiate the constitutional basis of sup-
pression cases, and thereby reject the thirty-year development of
a principle now widely accepted, the prosecutor should be re-
quired to reveal all relevant evidence to the defendant. 34
An example of how the Brady rationale may be of value to the de-
fense would be for counsel to request, before trial, to see all of the prose-
cutor's information. 3' This motion probably would be denied. After
trial, defense counsel would be free to move for a new trial, alleging the
withholding of evidence in very broad terms. By use of this method,
any conviction obtained where the defendant's motion was refused
would be subjected to constitutional attack on due process grounds." In
fact, this method could be used for a new attack on the Jencks Act based
on constitutional grounds.3 7 The situation would assume the refusal of
inspection prior to trial where the statement of a government witness
would have contained information of great potential importance for the
preparation for trial, but was of little value when it was furnished at
trial.
WISCONSIN AND THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT
TO INSPECTION OF PROSECUTION INFORMATION
In order to determine what effect the gradual liberalization of crim-
inal discovery is likely to have on Wisconsin law, it is necessary to con-
sider the present provisions of the Wisconsin Statutes affecting criminal
discovery and also the decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. On
this basis, it will be possible to consider the effect on Wisconsin law of
the current federal trend and also the effect of the decisions of other
state courts. The first area to be dealt with will be the possibilities for
discovery under the Wisconsin Statutes.
3 Supra note 20, at 146-147.
4 Id. at 149.
35 Supra note 4, at 515-516.36 However, see United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., USDC SNY, 34 L. W.
2114 where this approach was unsuccessful.
37 Supra note 4, at 516.
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Under section 954.025 of the Wisconsin Statutes, testimony taken
in a John Doe proceeding is not open to inspection unless it is used by
the prosecution at either the preliminary hearing or the trial, and then
only to the extent to which the prosecution uses it. Since the statutory
language has been strictly construed, John Doe testimony is kept secret,
subject only to the mentioned statutory exceptions. Even these statutory
rights of the defendant are limited where the John Doe proceedings
have not been closed. 38 In State ex rel Johnson v. Coffey, 39 the court
quoted from Steensland v. Hoppmzan,40 which dealt with grand jury
testimony, and gave the following reason for denying John Doe testi-
mony to the defendant:
And there exists the very practical reason, especially applic-
able to the situation where the jury is continuing to sit, that an
inspection of the minutes, if permitted to any defendant for the
purpose of preparing his defense, would advise the public of the
subject under investigation, afford an opportunity to those inter-
ested in thwarting an inquiry into their acts of secreting evidence,
tampering with prospective testimony, and generally embarrassing
the work to be done by the grand jury, if not entirely defeating
the object for which that body is designed.
The same reasons are applicable to a John Doe proceeding. 41
In every criminal action a complaint must be issued pursuant to sec-
tion 954.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes and the offense charged must be
stated in the complaint.42 It is apparent that the purpose of the complaint
is to do no more than to notify the defendant of the crime charged.
If there is a showing of probable cause by the district attorney be-
fore a magistrate, the magistrate may issue a warrant or a summons.43
The warrant or the summons state the charge as it was stated in the
complaint.
44
Every defendant is entitled by statute in Wisconsin to a preliminary
examination.45 At this examination the state must produce sufficient
evidence to justify the defendant being bound over for trial. The test
of what is sufficient evidence for these purposes has been stated as
38 State ex rel Niedziejko v. Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 398; 126 N.W. 2d 96, 99
(1964). See also State ex rel Distenfeld v. Neelen, 255 Wis. 214, 218; 38
N.W. 2d 703, 704 (1949).
39 18 Wis. 2d 529; 118 N.W. 2d 939 (1963).
40 Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1936).
4'Supra note 39, at 546; 118 N.W. 2d at 949.
42 WIs. STATS. §960.36 (1963).
4' State ex rel White v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W. 2d 391 (1965), states
that the district attorney or corporation counsel cannot constitutionally be
empowered to authorize the issuance of a warrant, since they are not the
equivalent of a neutral and detached magistrate. However, they may issue a
summons pursuant to WIS. STATs. 954.02 (4) (1963).
44 WIS. STATS. §954.02 (2) (1963).
45 WIs. STATS. §955.18 (1963). In some instances it may be advisable to waive
the preliminary examination. For example, if the preliminary examination is
waived, the district attorney cannot charge a more serious crime than was
charged in the information. Theis v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 189 N.W. 539 (1929).
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not whether guilt in those respects has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, but merely whether the evidence, worthy of
consideration in any respect for the judicial mind to act upon,
rendered the charge against the prisoner within reasonable prob-
abilities.46
Under this rule, the state need not produce all the witnesses which it
intends to use at trial nor its best evidence. 47 Obviously, the defendant
will obtain some idea of the evidence which will be used against him
from evidence which the state presents and also from his cross-examina-
tion of the witnesses. However, the extent of the knowledge he gains
will depend largely on what evidence the prosecution feels it is neces-
sary to produce.
4 8
After the preliminary examination, the information can be filed. A
defendant is entitled to a copy of the indictment or information, the
contents of which are specified by section 955.14 of the statutes. 49 The
rule for determining the sufficiency of the statement of the statutory
offense is that a "statement of an offense in the language of the statute
is sufficient whenever enough is stated in connection with the use of the
statutory language to inform the accused of the particular act of viola-
tion claimed."5
Here also the defendant will receive only enough information as to
the details and circumstances of the crime with which he is charged as
to satisfy this requirement. Practically speaking, it is unlikely that the
knowledge obtained from both the preliminary examination and the
indictment or the information will provide an adequate basis for the
defendant to prepare for trial, except in very simple fact situations.
Another possible help to defense counsel in the preparation for trial
is the bill of particulars. Counsel may move for a bill of particulars in
those cases where the indictment or information, though valid, is indefi-
nite as to the particular charge or occurence referred to and therefore
hinders the preparation of the defense. In Wisconsin the defendant has
a right to have the charge made certain.51 However, the refusal to fur-
nish such a bill is not necessarily error if the defendant had access to
information sufficient to make the charge certain. 52 The time and the
manner in which the bill of particulars is to be furnished is discretion-
4 State v. Whatley, 210 Wis. 157, 164; 245 N.W. 93, (1932).
47 State ex rel. Brill v. Spieker, 271 Wis. 237, 241 ; 72 N.W. 2d 906, 908 (1955).
48 Even if the district attorney fails to introduce sufficient evidence, when it
was available to him, to justify binding the defendant over for trial a second
complaint charging the same crime may be issued upon the same evidence.
Tell v. Wolke 21 Wis. 2d 613; 124 N.W. 2d 655 (1963).
49 XVIS. STATS. §955.05 (1963), entitles the defendant to a copy of the indictment
or information.
50 Liskowitz v. State, 229 Wis. 636, 641; 282 N.W. 103, 105 (1939). See also
Unger v. State, 231 Wis. 8; 284 N.W. 18 (1939).
51 Secor v. State, 118 Wis. 621, 632; 95 N.W. 942, 946 (1903).52 Ibid.
[Vol. 49
COMMENTS
ary with the court, so long as the defendant will be fully able to prepare
for trial. 3. Assuming this motion is granted, the defendant should be
adequately informed of the charge facing him, but he has little knowl-
edge of the evidence to be offered against him at trial. For instance, he
does not know the names of witnesses for the state and therefore he
cannot investigate their backgrounds for such facts as convictions for
crimes, even if he could obtain knowledge of these facts from police
records.
Some other statutes may be of possible help to defense counsel in the
preparation for trial. It has been suggested that Wisconsin Statute sec-
tion 269.65, which authorizes pretrial procedure in civil actions, might
be applied in criminal procedure as well._4 However, in view of its
recent amendment, this is probably no longer possible.5 5 At one time it
was also suggested that section 269.57 which authorizes inspection of
books and documents in the possession or under the control of the other
party might be applicable to criminal procedure. However, this is un-
likely in view of the section's placement within Title XXV of the stat-
utes, which is entitled "Procedure in Civil Actions." In addition, the
scope of this title is limited to civil actions by secton 260.01 of the Wis-
consin statutes.50
One statute that may be of possible help is Wisconsin Statute section
887.06(1)57 which authorizes the taking of depositions in criminal ac-
tions. This statute provides:
If it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend
or prevented from attending a criminal trial or hearing, that his
testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposi-
tion in order to prevent a failure of justice, the court at anytime
after the filing of an indictment or information may upon motion
and notice to the parties order that his testimony be taken by
deposition and that any designated books, papers, documents or
tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time or
place.
One possible construction of this statute that could be urged is that
a showing of necessity for a fair trial and also of materiality would be
sufficient to allow the defendant to take depositions of witnesses as to
what actually happened. This interpretation would give the defendant
an opportunity to obtain knowledge of the testimony to be offered
against him, without a showing that the witness would not be able to
attend.
53 State ex rel. Drew v. Shaughnessy, 212 Wis. 322, 336; 249 Wis. 522, 527; 90
A.L.R. 368 (1933).
54 Tibbs, Criminal Procedure Under Proposed Federal Rides Compared With
Wisconsin Statutes, 28 MARQ. L. REv. 75, 85 (1944).55 Wis. STATS. 269.65 was amended by Wisconsin Supreme Court order of No-
vember 10, 1960 (25 Wis. 2d vi), to read: "In all contested civil actions.!56 1955 Wis. L. REv. 672, 675 and 676.
57 This section was formerly §326.06 (1).
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However, the decision of State ex rel. Drew v. Shaughnessy,"8 which
was concerned with the right of the defendant to confront the witness
under a former version of tht statute, tends to indicate that this con-
struction would not be accepted. Instead, the fact that the witness would
be unable to attend or prevented from attending the criminal trial or
hearing would also have to be shown. In this event, discovery by deposi-
tion would be available only where all of the conditions set forth in the
statute are met.
Finally, the use of the subpoena duces tecum has been suggested as
a method for obtaining a particular instrument of evidence, such as a
confession. The question of whether the subpoena duces tecum can be
used in this manner has remained unsettled.5 9
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS
Wisconsin has consistently held to the common law doctrine that the
defendant is not entitled to inspect the evidence and other information
which the prosecution has gathered."0 The statement of the supreme
court whenever the issue was raised has been, "One accused of crime
enjoys no right to an inspection of evidence relied upon by the public
authorities for his conviction."6 1
A request prior to trial for a list of prosecution witnesses was de-
nied in Cornell v. State,62 since there was neither a common law right
nor a statutory right to a list of witnesses.
In Havenor v. State,63 where the defendant was denied a copy of
grand jury testimony prior to trial, the court said that there is no dis-
tinction between this situation and that of a request for a list of wit-
nesses. It then stated:
We do not see how the defendant can be prejudiced by with-
holding such information until the evidence is offered upon the
trial, nor is it suggested in what respect this practice prevents
him from procuring and adducing all the evidence at hand to es-
tablish the facts of his defense. The charge preferred in the in-
dictment, information, or complaint fully informs him as to what
facts the prosecution expects to establish by the evidence upon
the trial, and this meets all the necessary requirements of the
right which the accused has in criminal cases to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
64
58 212 Wis. 322; 249 N.W. 522, 524 (1933).
59 Supra note 56, 676 and 677.
60 Steffes, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 10 PRAc. LAw. 61. 66 (1964).
61 State ex rel. Spencer v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388, 392; 223 N.W. 861, 862 (1929).
This same statement is repeated in State ex rel. Schroeder v. Page, 206 Wis.
611, 240 N.AN. 173 (1932) ; Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W.
146 (1934) ; State v. Herman, 219 Wis. 267, 262 N.W. 718 (1935). A similar
statement is found in Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 65, 30 N.W. 226 (1886).
62 104 Wis. 527, 539; 80 N.W. 745, 749 (1899).
63 125 Wis. 444; 104 N.W. 116; 4 Ann. Cas. 1052 (1905).
6-4 Id. at 450; 104 N.W. at 118. Inspection of grand iury testimony was also
denied in Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934).
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From this statement one of the court's underlying reasons for re-
fusing to grant pretrial discovery appears. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has taken the position that defendants will not be prejudiced by
the withholding of evidence until the actual trial. In other words, it
feels that defendants can adequately prepare for trial by being informed
in the indictment or information as to the nature and cause of the accu-
sations against them.
Another reason for denying discovery was explained in State ex rel
Spencer v. Freedy,65 which involved an action to secure a preemptory
writ of mandamus to compel the state fire marshall to permit the inspec-
tion of the results of his investigation of a fire. The plaintiff, who was
suing to recover her claim against the insurer of her property, claimed
the right to inspect the records under a statute providing that the state
fire marshall keep records and statistics regarding fires. It also provided
that "such statistics shall be at all times open to the public inspection."
Since the law was intended to further the purposes of apprehending
and punishing those guilty of arson, and the releasing of the testimony
of all persons taken in investigations could hurt the enforcement of the
law. the court held that the legislature intended only that general sta-
tistics of educational value were to be released to the public. The court
said in arriving at this conclusion that:
... if such testimony as well as other information coming to the
knowledge of the state fire marshall is subject to public inspec-
tion, it is subject to the inspection of the person who may be
accused of the crime of arson as the result of such investigation.
One accused of crime enjoys no right to an inspection of evidence
relied upon by the public authorities for his conviction.66
This decision denies to the public information gathered by state
agencies in order to insure that defendants will not be able to inspect
them. While the court states that the defendant has no right to the in-
formation, the reason for denying public access to the information ap-
pears to be that doing so might hinder the apprehending and punishing
of those guilty of arson. If inspection might be of benefit to those guilty
of a crime, might not the denial of it hinder the accused's preparation
for trial?
Defendants have been similarly denied inspection in the cases of
State ex rel Schroeder v. Page67 and State v. Herman,68 which dealt with
John Doe testimony.
Whether prior statements made by prosecution witnesses are dis-
coverable has been the issue of several appeals to the Wisconsin Su-
65 198 Wis. 388. 223 N.W. 861 (1929).
66 Id. at 392.
67206 Wis. 611, 240 N.W. 173 (1932).
68 219 Wis. 267, 262 N.W. 718 (1935).
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preme Court. It has been held to be improper for a district attorney to
deny a prior statement to defense counsel when requested at trial for
impeachment purposes after a witness admitted that he had made prior
statements. 6 9 But since the witness admitted that there were inconsisten-
cies between his testimony at the trial and his earlier statements, the
error was not prejudical.
Even though the prosecuting witness makes contradictory statements
before trial and defense counsel learns of this fact, he cannot inspect
these statements until the trial. 70 At the trial, these statements are avail-
able, if requested, for impeachment purposes. Prior statements of wit-
nesses will be available for impeachment purposes, if they are requested.
In order to have the right to inspect prior statements, it must be shown
that prior statements were made, usually by asking the witness if he did
make prior statements. Defense counsel need not show any inconsistency
between the statements, but must make clear his purpose of impeaching
the witness, to justify his asking questions about prior statements and
dlso his requests for inspection of the prior statements.-1
POSSIBLE TRENDS IN WISCONSIN CRIMINAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
In view of these past decisions dealing with the defendant's right to
inspection of prosecution information, several conclusions can be drawn.
The cases dealing with discovery prior to trial have established in Wis-
consin the English common law rule that the defendant enjoys no right
to inspection of prosecution evidence. Apparently any statute modifying
the common law rule will be strictly construed. This harsh view has
been tempered somewhat by allowing inspection at trial of prior state-
ments of state witnesses, where defense counsel can establish that the
statements were made, and he requests them for impeachment purposes.
The allowance of inspection at trial together with the granting of con-
tinuance, if necessary, would be in accordance with the generally ac-
cepted view of what is necessary for a fair trial under the United States
Constitution.7
2
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision which clarified
the right of the defendant to have access at trial to prior statements of
witnesses without showing a contradiction, quoted from a California
decision. The California case, People v. Chapman73 dealt with the same
issue as the Wisconsin case. The quotation is as follows:
Ordinarily a defendant cannot show that a statement contains
contradictory matters until he has seen it, and, if such a showing
69 State ex rel. Byre v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 16 Wis. 2d 197; 114 N.W.
2d 114 (1962).
70 State v. Richards, 21 Wis. 2d 622; 124 N.W. 2d 684 (1963).
71 Ibid.
72 Supra note 18. See also 353 U.S. 657, 666-668.
7352 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P. 2d 428 (1959).
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were a condition precedent to production, his rights would be de-
pendent upon the highly fortuitous circumstances of his detailed
knowledge as to the contents of the statement.7 4
Use of this quotation is intriguing for two reasons. First of all, it shows
that the accused cannot be presumed to have sufficient, detailed knowl-
edge to adequately present his case in all situations. This idea also em-
bodies the principle that the defendant is presumed to be innocent at
trial. The question remains as to whether this concept should be ex-
tended to pretrial stages. If it is, then the same argument, namely that
it would be highly unlikely that the defendant would have sufficient
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the offense to adequately
prepare for trial would apply to requests for pretrial inspection.
Secondly, the California Court is considered to be liberal in regard
to discovery, whereas the Wisconsin Court is considered to be one of
the conservative courts in this respect.75 While the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has held that the defendant has no right to discovery prior to
trial, California has held that the defendant will be allowed not only to
obtain inspection at trial but also to obtain pretrial inspection of unpriv-
ileged evidence or information that might lead to discovery of such
evidence, if it reasonably appears that such knowledge will help him
in preparing his defense.76 The California Court allows the prosecution
to make a countervailing showing that the information may be used for
an improper purpose, but in the absence of such showing, discovery is
a matter of right.
77
This investigation of Wisconsin law naturally leads to the question
of whether or not Wisconsin criminal discovery procedure should be
liberalized.
Any decision on this question would have to consider the policy
arguments which were stated at the beginning of this article. However,
the controversy seems to center on the question of whether the right of
the defendant to a fair trial entitles him to inspect the evidence and in-
formation gathered by the prosecution.
There are two bases for arguing that the defendant should be al-
lowed, in certain circumstances, to inspection prior to trial.
Normally we view the accused as being innocent until judgment is
rendered to the contrary. This presumption has played an important
part in the recognition of the right of the defendant to inspect evidence
introduced at trial. The reason for allowing inspection at trial is simply
that if the accused is innocent it is unlikely that he will be able to know
what evidence will be presented against him and therefore it will be un-
7 State v. Richards, 21 Wis. 2d 622, 633; 124 N.W. 2d 684, 689 and 690 (1963).
75Supra note 18, 243 and 244, discussing the California decisions in this area.
76 Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P. 2d 407 (1959).
7 Ibid.
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duly difficult for defense counsel to counteract the prosecution presen-
tation of evidence. Since pretrial inspection would lead to better prepar-
ation for trial and fewer convictions, in this sense law enforcement
would suffer.
However this idea is closely tied to the right of the defendant to a
fair trial, which demands that the accused have adequate procedural
means to defend himself at trial against the incriminating evidence pre-
sented by the prosecution. The Brady case establishes the rule that sup-
pression of evidence favorable to the accused, where it was requested,
violates due process. Many feel that if the defendant is to have an ade-
quate oportunity to prepare for trial, he must have the opportunity to
discover evidence and information before trial.
Allowing discovery prior to trial is likely to lead to quicker trials
and also less confusion at trial. Requests for inspection of prosecution
testimony, when made at trial cause an interruption of the trial. There
may also be a request for a continuance which will lead to a delay in the
completion of the trial. In addition, if evidence has been withheld from
the defendant prior to trial which could have been of value to him, the
rule of the Brady case may be applied.78
However, the warnings that liberal discovery could be used by crimi-
nals to suppress evidence and possibly avoid criminal prosecution, should
be heeded. If this abuse was likely in a particular case, this would cer-
tainly appear to be a justifiable grounds for denying discovery. But in
the majority of cases, and especially those involving indigent defendants,
liberal discovery would appear to be the better general rule.
C. MICHAEL CONTER
78 Supra note 20, at 147.
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